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Abstract
Several experimental studies have reported that an otherwise robust regularity – the
disparity between Willingness-To-Accept and Willingness-To-Pay – tends to be
greatly reduced in repeated markets, posing a serious challenge to existing reference-
dependent and reference-independent models alike. This paper offers a new account
of the evidence, based on the assumptions that individuals are affected by good and
bad deals relative to the expected transaction price (price sensitivity), with bad deals
having a larger impact on their utility (‘bad-deal’ aversion). These features of
preferences explain the existing evidence better than alternative approaches, including
the most recent developments of loss aversion models.
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1The disparity between the Willingness-To-Accept (WTA) and Willingness-To-Pay
(WTP) measures of value has been one of the most widely studied behavioural
regularities in the last four decades. The disparity – which has been documented in a
large number of contingent valuation and experimental studies1 – poses serious
challenges to Hicksian consumer theory and its applications to welfare economics.
While in Hicksian consumer theory WTA and WTP can reasonably be expected to
differ only by a few percentage points (Willig, 1976; Randall and Stoll, 1980) many
studies have reported differences of much higher orders of magnitude. Such large
disparities suggest that indifference curves are not reversible (Knetsch, 1989). They
imply that the impact of policies that produce changes in resource allocation cannot
be evaluated indifferently using the two measures, and that the resulting welfare
changes cannot be approximated by changes in consumer’s surplus. If improvements
and deteriorations are regarded as highly asymmetrical, the Coase theorem no longer
holds. Even in the absence of transaction costs and income effects, the outcome of a
negotiation critically depends on the allocation of property rights.
Yet, recently, several studies have found that the extent of the disparity is
greatly reduced for experienced traders (List, 2003a, 2004) and when agents
repeatedly interact in experimental markets (e.g. Shogren et al., 2001; Loomes et al.,
2003).
Taken at face value, this whole body of evidence poses a theoretical puzzle.
On the one hand, the existence and robustness of the disparity in one-off situations
seems to indicate that preferences depart from the assumptions of standard consumer
theory in systematic ways. This has led to the development of reference-dependent
models that incorporate such departures (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Sugden,
2003; Köszegi and Rabin, 2006; Loomes et al., 2009). On the other hand, preferences
elicited in experimental markets, in which subjects face feedback, repetition, and
incentives, appear sometimes to be compatible with the properties generally assumed
in reference-independent economic models.
This paper offers a solution to this puzzle based on an alternative account of
the WTA/WTP disparity. The proposed explanation combines reference-independent
consumer theory with a uni-dimensional notion of reference point represented by the
1 For a review see Horowitz and McConnell (2002).
2expected transaction price. This modelling approach uses the intuition that buyers’
behaviour is significantly affected by whether they regard prices as ‘cheap’ or ‘dear’
(Wicksteed,1910, p.33), and extends early analyses of reference prices (e.g. Thaler
1985; Putler 1992).
In the model, agents have reference-independent valuations for consumption
goods, as in standard consumer theory. In addition, they are assumed to be price
sensitive and ‘bad-deal’ averse in their transactions. This means that they like
making good deals and dislike being ripped off (price sensitivity), and that the pain
associated with bad deals is greater than the pleasure derived from same-sized good
deals (‘bad-deal’ aversion). Good and bad deals are defined relative to the expected
price of the transaction. These intuitive assumptions turn out to explain the evidence
of experimental markets better than competing explanations, including the latest
developments of reference-dependent consumer theory based on the well-known
notion of loss aversion (e.g. Köszegi and Rabin, 2006; Loomes et al. 2009).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1 summarises the
stylised facts concerning the WTA/WTP disparity. The basic model is presented in
Section 2. Section 3 derives WTA and WTP for price sensitive and bad-deal averse
agents, while Section 4 applies the model to repeated auctions. Section 5 discusses
the model’s implications and the related theoretical literature. Section 6 concludes.
1. The disparity between WTA and WTP: Stylised facts
The numerous studies that investigate WTA/WTP disparities in one-shot and repeated
market experiments have highlighted a series of regularities, which will be used as a
benchmark to assess the descriptive plausibility of various theoretical explanations
that have so far been put forward.
This paper is mainly concerned with four stylised facts. The first is the
WTA/WTP disparity itself. The second is the tendency for the disparity to decay
when WTA and WTP are elicited in repeated markets. The third is represented by so-
called shaping effects, that is, the tendency of WTA and WTP valuations reported in
repeated markets to move in the direction of observed market prices. The fourth and
final stylised fact is the finding that WTA and WTP tend to be different when elicited
3in different versions of the same demand-revealing auction mechanism. The
empirical support for each of the stylised facts is summarised below.
The WTA/WTP disparity
The WTA/WTP disparity appears to be an extremely robust and replicable
phenomenon. It has consistently been found in contingent valuation studies (e.g.
Hammack and Brown, 1974; Freeman, 1979; Rowe et al., 1980; Schulze et al., 1981),
one-shot experiments (e.g. Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Boyce et al., 1992; Bateman et
al., 1997), and in repeated market experiments (e.g. Coursey et al., 1987; Shogren et
al. 1994, 2001; Knetsch et al., 2001; Loomes et al., 2003). In a recent review,
Horowitz and McConnel (2002) report that the median ratio between mean WTA and
median WTP in forty-five of these studies is 2.6 (mean 7.2). With rare exceptions,
most notably Plott and Zeiler (2005), there seems to be unanimous agreement in the
literature about the existence of the disparity as an empirical regularity.2
The decay of the disparity
As mentioned in the introduction, several experimental studies have shown that the
extent of the WTA/WTP disparity tends to be greatly reduced when valuations are
elicited in repeated experimental markets. Most of the studies documenting this
decay have used variants of the Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961).3 In a kth-price
buying (respectively, selling) auction, n players submit a bid to buy (sell) one unit of a
commodity. The players submitting the k − 1 highest (lowest) bids buy (sell) one
unit at a price equal to the kth highest (lowest) bid (2 ≤ k < n). The value of k is
usually known in advance, but in the random variant it is randomly determined after
valuations are submitted. In what follows, the person submitting the kth highest
(lowest) bid will be referred to as the marginal trader. The marginal trader sets the
price and is just not willing to trade at that price. When values are private, as can be
confidently assumed in most of the literature reviewed in this Section, Vickrey
auctions promote truthful revelation of values, for bidding one's true valuation for the
2 As explained in Section 6.1, the hypothesis that WTA/WTP disparities are due to errors and
misconceptions (Plott and Zeiler, 2005) seems to be insufficient to explain the evidence reviewed here.
For a critical reassessment of Plott and Zeiler’s contribution, see Isoni et al. (2010).
3 Kahneman et al. (1990) use a different market institution, in which the price is determined so as to
equate demand and supply once bids and asks are submitted. They report significant undertrading
throughout repetitions, but the evolution of bids and offers cannot be clearly seen from their data.
4good is a (weakly) dominant strategy.4 In addition, since determining the market
price requires only that bids are rank-ordered, these auctions are also relatively easy to
implement in the lab.
Starting with Coursey et al. (1987), experiments employing various variants of
this auction mechanism have usually documented a tendency for the initially strong
disparity to reduce over successive rounds. The decay has been found to be
particularly pronounced in the 2nd-price version. For example, Shogren et al. (1994)
report that initial WTA/WTP ratios of two or more decrease to much lower values
after ten repetitions, with final ratios often not significantly greater than one. Similar
findings are reported by Shogren et al. (2001), and Knetsch et al. (2001).5 For various
types of goods and numbers of repetitions, the pattern seems to be the same: the
disparity tends to decay when subjects interact in 2nd-price auctions. Using the
median-price version of the auction, in which, since the price is equal to the median
valuation, buying and selling prices are comparable,6 Loomes et al. (2003) find that
the disparity generally persists – although in a less pronounced way – after six
repetitions, but is completely eroded at the level of the market prices. It seems,
therefore, that the second stylised fact can be stated more precisely as a general decay
of the disparity, accompanied by its complete erosion at the margin.
Shaping effects
The decay of the disparity has been interpreted as suggesting that individuals’
underlying preferences have the property that WTA ≈ WTP as in Hicksian theory.  
However, as Loomes et al. (2003) note, the convergence of valuations in 2nd-price
auctions can be explained by much simpler mechanisms. In fact, in a 2nd-price
auction with more than three traders, mean WTA would decrease and mean WTP
would increase if all participants revised their valuations in the direction of observed
market prices, simply because there are relatively more sellers whose WTAs are
4 This is not necessarily the case in common value auctions (see Milgrom and Weber, 1982).
5 Harless (1989) also uses the 2nd-price auction in a one-shot within-subject design, reporting a non-
significant median WTA/WTP ratio of 1.33, but his sample size (23 subjects) is quite small compared
to the other studies.
6 This is not true in general for the other non-random versions of the auction. In a 2nd-price auction
with more than three players, for example, if traders report their true valuations, the buying price
should be higher than the selling price.
5higher than the market price, and relatively more buyers whose WTPs are lower than
the market price. They label this tendency a shaping effect, because it suggests that
the market shapes valuations rather than revealing them. A confirmation of this
conjecture is the finding, reported by Knetsch et al. (2001), that in 9th-price auctions
with ten traders per group average WTA tends to increase, while average WTP
decreases as the market is repeated.7 And this evidence is consistent with the finding
that past prices are significant predictors of reported valuations (Cox and Grether,
1996).
Loomes et al. (2003) also provide more evidence in favour of the shaping
hypothesis. They conduct median-price auctions in which traders report valuations
for either a low-value or a high-value lottery. Depending on whether the majority of
traders are endowed with the high- or the low-value lottery, the market price will tend
to be relatively higher or lower, producing systematically different price feedback.
Loomes et al. report that, as the market is repeated, valuations move in the direction
of the price feedback as predicted by the shaping hypothesis. Reconciling shaping
effects with the existence of consistent preferences appears to be a rather challenging
task.
Sensitivity to the auction rules
The fourth and last regularity is not a stylised fact by virtue of its repeated occurrence,
but because of its interesting implications and the fact that none of the existing models
is able to explain it. The regularity consists in the unexpected difference between
initial valuations for different, but from a theoretical point of view equivalently
demand-revealing, versions of the Vickrey auctions. Investigating markets with ten
participants, Knetsch et al. (2001) find that behaviour in 9th-price auctions is
significantly different from that in 2nd-price auctions. This difference is observed, not
only in a between-subject design, but also in a within-subject design in which the
same individuals simultaneously take part in the two auctions. In both occasions,
7 Braga et al. (2009) conduct a similar comparison of the 2nd-price and second-to-last price auctions for
lottery tickets. In their experiment, subjects not only receive feedback on market prices, but also on the
outcome of the lottery. Although they do not report such an extreme divergence in the evolution of
WTA valuations over repetitions, they find evidence that valuations do tend to move in the direction of
observed prices. Strikingly, this finding also holds true when they use the random version of the
auction, in which market prices are much more erratic signals.
6mean WTA (WTP) in the first auction period is higher (lower) in the 9th- than in the
2nd-price version, as if subjects were anticipating the prices that the different auction
rules would generate. This sensitivity of valuations to the auction rules suggests that
not only do institutional features affect behaviour after feedback is provided, as
shown by shaping effects, but they can have an impact even before any information is
fed back to subjects. As will be explained in Section 5, none of the existing
explanations for the disparity can explain this finding. On the contrary, the model
presented in the next Sections nicely fits with all the stylised facts.
2. The model
In a recent article, Brown (2005) has reported that, contrary to what one would expect
according to the most popular versions of reference-dependent theory (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1991; Köszegi and Rabin, 2006), if subjects are asked to ‘think aloud’
when stating their WTA and WTP valuations, and to motivate any discrepancy
between the two values, they mention the pain associated with giving up endowments
extremely rarely (less than 3% of the occasions). By far, the most recurrent
motivations are associated with some notion of intrinsic utility (35% overall), seeking
a good deal or avoiding a bad deal (17%), and some reference to the cost or price to
pay to acquire the good in question (14%).8 These findings inspired the theoretical
model presented in this Section.
In the model, agents have reference-independent preferences for money
and consumption goods, which, consistently with standard consumer theory, are such
that WTA and WTP do not differ significantly. In addition, depending on how the
actual price compares with the expected price, they derive extra positive utility from
good deals – i.e. buying low, selling high – and negative utility from bad deals – i.e.
buying high, selling low. This tendency is dubbed price sensitivity, because the ex
ante evaluation of a transaction depends on the price that had been expected before
the transaction. In the analysis that follows, this price, which becomes the agent’s
8 The percentages are obtained from Brown (2005, Table 2, p. 373), which categorises subjects’
responses according to the reported motivation. The loss aversion figure is the sum of the values in
rows 11 and 12; the intrinsic value percentage refers to rows 1 and 2, seeking a good deal to row 3, and
the price to pay to acquire the good to row 4.
7reference point, will be labelled expected price.9 For a given absolute discrepancy
between the actual and the expected price, the impact of a bad deal is assumed to be
larger than that of a good deal. This feature of preferences is named bad-deal
aversion.10
A possible justification for using the expected price to evaluate a transaction
comes from the fact that most of the transactions that people ordinarily make require
them to decide whether or not to trade at a posted price. What is assumed here is that,
when they are faced with the related, though more unusual, decision of stating a WTA
or a WTP valuation, they construe the problem in as close a way as possible to that of
responding to a posted price. They form an expectation of what the price will be and
consider the counterfactual situations of trading at other prices. Given their pre-
transaction expectations, the WTA and WTP valuations are determined by the value
of the actual price that leaves them indifferent between trading and not trading.
These ideas are most easily formalised in a simplified scenario with only two
goods, money )(m and a consumption good )(x . As in Hicksian consumer theory,
9 It is important to note that the expression “expected price” is not meant to imply that individuals
obtain it by computing a (possibly weighted) average over a distribution of potential prices, but just
that they expected to trade at that price. This reference price is being modeled as a point estimate.
How itis obtained can vary across subjects and for different goods. As will be clear in the next two
Sections, for the purposes of explaining the stylized facts that are the object of this paper, it is sufficient
to assume that such a price exists for every subject.
This feature of the model is also what distinguishes it from other theories, such as disappointment
theory (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986), in which agents optimize over the expected value of a
modified utility that incorporates feelings of disappointment and ‘elation’, defined in relation to the ex-
ante expected utility of consumption. In these theories, the feelings are anticipated and affect the agent
regardless of their subsequent decisions. In the model presented here – which has no pretence to apply
to fully rational agents – much less sophistication is assumed. Agents do not anticipate their reaction to
the actual price, so that their utility is only affected if they actually trade.
10 The label ‘bad-deal aversion’ is used here to differentiate it from the general notion of loss aversion,
i.e. the idea that, relative to a reference point, losses loom larger than corresponding gains. In most
applications of reference-dependent theory, loss aversion applies to changes of holdings of goods
relative to a multi-dimensional reference point (current endowment, customary consumption, or
expected transaction outcome), and it is often assumed that it does not apply to money outlays (e.g.
Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). By contrast, bad-deal aversion only applies to (expected) losses of
money relative to the expected price, and only matters if transactions actually occur. In this sense, bad-
deal aversion can be regarded as a form of ‘loss aversion without endowment effect’ (Brown, 2005).
8agents derive utility from how much of m and x they consume. For simplicity, this
reference-independent utility is assumed to be linear. In addition, utility also
dependson a reference-dependent component representing the net monetary gain of
the transaction )(z leading to the particular ),( xm combination. The overall utility
function takes the form:
)(=),,( zfxmzxmU   (1)
where m + γx is the linear reference-independent utility, in which the marginal utility
of money is normalised to 1 so that γ represents both the (constant) marginal utility of 
x and the marginal rate of substitution between m and x. The last term in the utility
function, f(z), is the reference-dependent component, in which:
)(= ppxz e  (2)
In Equation (2), x is the change in the quantity of x, which is positive when agents
buy and negative when they sell, pe is the expected price of the transaction, and p is
the actual price.11 Positive monetary gains 0)>(z are regarded as good deals, while
monetary losses 0)<(z are bad deals. In a buying scenario, 0)>( x , good deals
consist in paying less than expected )>( ppe and bad deals in paying more )<( ppe .
In a selling situation, 0)<( x , good deals occur for prices above expectations
)<( ppe , and bad deals for prices below )>( ppe .12
To simplify things, and since this is sufficient to explain the stylised facts, the
traded quantity is assumed to be one, i.e. |Δx| = 1, and f(z) is assumed to be two-piece
linear,13 that is:
11 In principle, Δx can be interpreted as either the expected trade at pe, or the actual trade at p.
Although the distinction is irrelevant for what follows, the latter interpretation is more in the spirit of
the argument.
12 The presence of this form of expectations in the utility function, which is not a common modelling
approach in economics, is reminiscent of the utility transformation introduced by Geanakoplos et al.
(1989) in their psychological games. Geanakoplos et al. assume that the utility associated with a given
combination of strategies depends not only on the outcomes that the strategies produce, but also on
players’ prior beliefs about which strategy will be played. In the present context, for a buyer the
expected price can be interpreted as their belief about what the other player will charge. The utility
associated with the final outcome of a transaction will depend on how the actual price compares with
this belief, with higher levels of utility for good deals and lower for bad deals.
13 For a more general version of the model see Isoni (2009).
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or more concisely as:
,0)(min,0)(max=)( zzzf   (3)
Here, α max (z, 0) captures the effect of good deals, while β min (z, 0) captures the
effect bad deals.  It is assumed that β ≥ α ≥ 0, with strict inequalities reflecting price 
sensitivity (α > 0) and bad-deal aversion (β > 0).  
Given these assumptions, it is easy to derive the expressions for WTA and
WTP. Let F(p, pe) denote the net utility of selling one unit of x at price p when the
expected price is pe. That is, given the expected price, F(p, pe) represents the
difference between the utility of selling one unit of x and the utility of not selling.
Using Equations (1)–(3), it can be written as:
  ,0)(min,0)(max=),( eee pppppppF (4)
F(p, pe) is monotonically increasing in p and two-piece linear, with a kink at p = pe,
where it equals ppF =)( , the net utility of selling one unit of x in the reference-
independent case (i.e. when α = β = 0).  The agent’s WTA is the value of p that makes
them indifferent between selling their unit of x and not selling it, that is, the value of p
such that F(p, pe) = 0. Then, simple algebra shows that:
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
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



11
1
<
11
1
=)(WTA (5)
Similarly, let G(p, pe) denote the net utility of buying one unit of x at price p when the
expected price is pe, that is, the difference between the utility of buying one unit of x
and the utility of not buying. Equations (1)–(3) imply:
,0)(min,0)(max=),( pppppppG eee   (6)
G(p, pe) is monotonically decreasing in p, two-piece linear and kinked at p = pe,
where it equals ppG =)( , the reference-independent utility deriving from buying
one unit of x at price p. The agent's WTP is the value of p that makes them indifferent
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Solving this condition for p gives:
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Equations (5) and (7) show that under price sensitivity and bad-deal aversion, WTA
and WTP become functions of the expected price. These expressions are all that is
needed to prove the main results of the paper, which are presented in the next two
Sections. Section 3 explores the relationship between WTA and WTP, showing under
which conditions WTA exceeds WTP. Section 4 applies the model to the case of
repeated Vickrey auctions.
3 General results
This Section explores the implications of price sensitivity and bad-deal aversion by
treating expectations as exogenous. Before turning to that task, it is worth noting that
in the absence of price sensitivity and bad-deal aversion, both WTA and WTP would
coincide with the reference-independent valuation, for it follows immediately from
expressions (5) and (7) that WTA = WTP = γ if β = α = 0.  Let us start from price 
sensitivity.
14 Note that, in principle, as far as quantity changes are concerned, there are four measures of welfare
change: (i) WTP for a gain, (ii) WTA for a loss, (iii) WTP to avoid a loss, also known as equivalent
loss, and (iv) WTA to forgo a gain, also known as equivalent gain (e.g. Bateman et al., 1997). Here,
both measures are derived so as to keep the agent’s utility unchanged relative to their pre-trade
position, which differs for WTA and WTP. Therefore, the notions used here correspond to (i) and (ii).
Although these are also known as quantity-compensating and quantity-equivalent variation,
(Hicks,1943) respectively, following the modern convention – mostly applied to price changes (e.g.
Mas-Colell et al., 1995) – to define as compensating variations those that take the agent back to the
original utility level after the change has occurred, and as equivalent variations those that would take
them to the same utility level as the quantity change, both measures should be classified as
compensating variations (the corresponding equivalent variations being (iii) and (iv) above). Given
this ambiguity in the terminology, in order to avoid confusion, no further reference to equivalent and
compensating variations will be made in the remainder of this paper.
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Result 1 (Effect of price sensitivity) Price sensitivity (α > 0) implies:   
i) ep<WTAWTP<  if ep<
ii) ep=WTA=WTP= if ep=
iii) <WTAWTP< ep if ep>
Proof. See Appendix.
Leaving aside the relationship between WTA and WTP, which mainly
depends on bad-deal aversion (see Result 2 below), the main implication of Result 1
is that the WTA and WTP valuations always lie between the reference-independent
valuation (γ) and the price expectation.  When the agent expects the price to coincide 
with her reference-independent valuation, she is willing to accept no less, and willing
to pay no more, than this value. When she expects a higher price, she overasks and
overbids, that is, both her WTA and her WTP exceed her intrinsic valuation.
Intuitively, selling for as little as γ results in a bad deal that leaves the agent worse-off
relative to not selling. On the other hand, bidding only γ prevents her from buying at
advantageous prices. By overasking, the agent discounts the disutility of a bad deal,
while by overbidding she takes into account the extra pleasure deriving from making
a good deal. Similarly, when the price expectation lies below the intrinsic valuation,
agents underask in order not to forgo possible good deals, and underbid to avoid
making bad deals. This tendency appears whenever agents are price sensitive 0)>(
, regardless of whether they are bad-deal averse or not )(   .
As the following Remark stresses, a closer look at Equations (5) and (7) shows
that price sensitivity has another important implication.
Remark 1 WTA and WTP are increasing in the price expectation pe.
Price expectations determine if a given actual price p represents a good or a
bad deal, the size of which is a function of the absolute difference between the two
prices – see Equation (2). The larger this difference, the larger the impact on overall
utility and on WTA and WTP.
The following Result shows what happens when agents are not only price
sensitive, but also bad-deal averse.
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Result 2 (Effect of bad-deal aversion) Price sensitivity and bad-deal
aversion (β > α > 0) imply: 
i) epWTAWTP <<< if ep<
ii) epWTAWTP === if ep=
iii) <<< WTAWTPpe if ep>
Proof. See Appendix.
The following Remark shows that bad-deal aversion )>(  is a necessary
condition for the WTA/WTP disparity to occur, and that the size of the disparity
depends on the distance between the intrinsic valuation and the expected price.
Remark 2 Equations (5) and (7) imply that the difference between WTA and
WTP increases with the distance between γ and pe. That is:
||
))(1(1
=WTPWTA ep


 

 (8)
The intuition behind Result 2 can be illustrated with reference to Figures 1 to 3. In
each Figure, ),( eppF represents the net utility of selling one unit of x at price p when
the expected price is pe for a price sensitive and bad-deal averse agent whose intrinsic
valuation is γ. It is monotonically increasing in p, kinked at epp = , with a slope of
1 for epp < , and 1 for epp > . The corresponding net utility in the
reference-independent case, ppF =)( , is depicted as the increasing straight
dashed line with a slope of 1. ),( eppG and )( pG are the net utilities of buying one
unit of x in the reference-dependent and reference-independent case respectively.
),( eppG is monotonically decreasing in p, kinked at epp = , and sloped )(1 
for epp < and )(1  for epp > . )( pG is the straight dashed line with a slope of
1 . Both ),( eppF and ),( eppG are steepest for prices that correspond to bad deals.
As explained in Section 2, WTA and WTP are defined by the condition that
the net utilities of selling and buying are equal to zero. In the reference-independent
case both conditions are satisfied for =p , where the )( pF and the )( pG curves
intersect. That is, if preferences are reference-independent, both WTA and WTP
13
equal the intrinsic valuation. When price sensitivity and bad-deal aversion are added,
this is no longer true in general. WTA is defined by the condition 0=),( eppF ,
while WTP satisfies 0=),( eppG . Figures 1 to 3 refer to cases i)–iii) in Result 2.
Figure 1 – WTA and WTP when γ < pe
If ep< as in Figure 1, ),( eppF cuts the horizontal axis where its slope is 1 ,
while ),( eppG cuts it where its slope is )(1  . This makes WTA greater than
WTP. In other words, overasking is a result of price sensitivity and bad-deal
aversion, while overbidding is only due to price sensitivity.
When ep= as in Figure 2, the four curves all intersect the horizontal axis
where =p . If the agent does not make good nor bad deals, there is no disparity,
and WTA and WTP are both equal to the intrinsic valuation γ, as in the reference-
independent case.
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Figure 2 – WTA and WTP when γ = pe
Finally, when ep> as shown in Figure 3, the agent underasks because of
price sensitivity – the ),( eppF curve cuts the horizontal axis where its slope is 1
– and underbids because of both price sensitivity and bad-deal aversion – the
),( eppG curve intersects the p axis where its slope equals )(1  . Again, WTA
exceeds WTP because of bad-deal aversion.
Figure 3 – WTA and WTP when γ > pe
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Since there is no a priori reason for the expected price always to coincide with
the reference-independent valuation, bad-deal aversion is the key to explaining the
first stylised fact. Interestingly, for any given level of bad-deal aversion, if the
distribution of price expectations is more dispersed for goods which are not ordinarily
traded in markets than for market goods, Remark 2 leads to expect a larger disparity
for the former than for the latter, as reported by Horowitz and McConnell (2002).
4 Bidding in repeated Vickrey auctions
This Section explores the implications of price sensitivity and bad-deal aversion for
bidding behaviour in repeated thk -price selling (buying) auctions. Unless otherwise
stated, it is assumed that n traders take part in a finite number of auction rounds, T.
Players are indexed by ni ,1,=  , so that n  21 , where i is the reference-
independent private valuation of trader i, while auction rounds are denoted by
subscript Tt ,1,=  . The notation will be slightly modified to account for this.
Quantities that vary only across individuals have subscript i only (e.g. i , i , i ),
quantities that vary only over time have subscript t only (e.g. the market price, tp ),
and quantities that vary across individuals and over time have both subscripts (e.g. eitp
, itWTA , and itWTP ).
The dependence of WTA and WTP on the expected price – see Equations (5)
and (7) – suggests a natural way in which the model can deal with repetition: the
feedback provided after each round changes individuals' expectations of the market
price, and so their valuations. Based on this feature, bidding behaviour in repeated
Vickrey auctions is analysed on the assumption that, conditional on their eitp , in each
round traders correctly report their )(WTA eitit p and )(WTP
e
itit p .
The following Result shows the conditions under which, treating price
expectations as exogenous, the n traders will display a WTA/WTP disparity at the
aggregate level in any auction round t.
Result 3 (The WTA/WTP disparity) If 0>> ii  for all ni ,1,=  , and,
in any period t, eiti p for some i, then:
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Proof. See Appendix.
When n price sensitive and bad-deal averse agents take part in both the selling
and buying auction, a disparity between mean WTA and mean WTP is very likely to
arise. For example, this happens if price expectations are the same for all traders and
there is variation in intrinsic values, or viceversa. When different groups of subjects
take part in the two markets, the Result holds under similar conditions if the two
groups are random draws from the same population.
The next two Results illustrate how expectation updating can influence
bidding behaviour.
Result 4 (Shaping effects) If price expectations are revised in the direction
of previously observed market prices, then WTA and WTP will show the same
tendency.
Proof. See Appendix.
Result 4 offers the expectation updating mechanism as the candidate for
explaining shaping effects. In principle, any mechanism based on feedback such that
price expectations are revised towards the market price observed in the previous
period is potentially able to produce a shaping effect on WTA and WTP valuations.
An example of a simple mechanism with this property is the adaptive expectations
rule, 11, )(1=   t
e
ti
e
it ppp  , where 1<0  , according to which the price
expectation in period t is a weighted average of the previous period's actual and
expected prices. The model's ability to produce shaping effects hinges on price
sensitivity.
Result 5 (Sensitivity to the auction rules) If the n agents expect the market
price in a kth-price selling (respectively, buying) auction to be higher (respectively,
lower) than the price in the jth-price version, nkj  <2 , then, for all i, )(WTA 11
e
ii p
))(WTP,( 11
e
ii plyrespective will be higher (respectively, lower) in the former than in
the latter case.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Because of price sensitivity, the model can display the sensitivity of stated
valuations to the auction rules observed by Knetsch et al. (2001). What is required is
a basic understanding of the market mechanism. Agents need only to realise that, for
a given set of bids, the selling (buying) price will be higher (lower) in a 9th- than in a
2nd-price auction.15
Price expectations have so far been treated as exogenous to the market in any
given period. If these expecations are treated as endogenous, a market equilibrium
can be defined as a situation in which expectations are correct for all traders, that is,
when ppei = * for all i, where p* is the equilibrium market price.
16 The following
Result holds.
Result 6 (Equilibrium bidding) Consider a kth-price selling (respectively,
thkn 1)(  -price buying) auction with n traders, nk <2  . Let iV be the WTA
(respectively, WTP ) valuation of trader i. If ppei = * for all }{1, ni , then:
i) pVii << * if ki  <
ii) pVkk == *
iii) pVii >> * if ki  >
Proof. See Appendix.
Result 6 illustrates how, even in the presence of price sensitive and/or bad-
deal averse traders, Vickrey auctions still maintain desirable demand-revealing
properties. The equilibrium market price reflects the reference-independent valuation
of the marginal trader. Although other traders' reported valuations do not coincide
with their intrinsic values, everyone makes the optimal decision in terms of how the
market price compares to the reference-independent valuation. In other words, the
equilibrium outcome – i.e. trading/not trading – for each player is the same as the one
that would result from reporting the reference-independent valuation.
15 For this to happen, it is not essential that agents anticipate the price sensitivity of others. If they do,
the effect can be even stronger, as the whole distribution of valuations on which they base their price
expectations shifts in a consistent direction.
16 From now on, the time subscript, t, is suppressed to ease notation.
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The implications of Result 6 are best seen in the context of median-price
auctions with an odd number of traders. Recall that in such auctions, if agents bid
their intrinsic valuations, the selling and buying prices coincide. Result 6 establishes
that buying and selling prices coincide in equilibrium, even if agents are strictly price
sensitive and strictly bad-deal averse. However, in the latter case, an aggregate
disparity persists if intrinsic values differ across traders, for WTA equals WTP only
for the marginal trader. Depending on the initial dispersion of price expectations, the
overall disparity is very likely to be attenuated by the process through which they
converge to the equilibrium price, closely reproducing the pattern documented by
Loomes et al (2003).
5 Loss aversion or bad-deal aversion?
A number of explanations for the WTA/WTP disparity have been put forward in the
last four decades. It has been argued that the disparity arises due to lack of
substitution possibilities (Hanemann, 1991; Adamowicz et al., 1993; Shogren et al.,
1994)), to costly information acquisition (Kolstad and Guzman, 1999), to the
incompleteness of preferences (Mandler, 2004), or to evolutionary pressures (Huck et
al., 2005). However, the idea that preferences are reference-dependent, initially
proposed by Thaler (1980) and formalised by Tversky and Kahneman (1991), has by
far received the most attention. This argument regards the disparity as a consequence
of loss aversion, which makes the pain associated with giving up an item that is part
of one’s endowment larger than the pleasure due to the acquisition of the same item.
As noted in the introduction, however, any explanation of the disparity has to
come to grips with the apparently conflicting evidence that the disparity, so
pronounced in one-off decisions, tends to be greatly reduced in repeated markets, and
should be able to explain the other stylised facts documented in Section 1. It seems
that the key ingredients that any explanation needs in order to be able to accomplish
this are two: a mechanism that produces the disparity, and a mechanism through
which experience leads to its general decay and its erosion at the margin. Three
approaches in the literature seem to fit these requirements, the standard preferences
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plus error approach, the anomalies plus shaping approach, and the endogenous
reference-dependent approach.17
The standard preferences plus error approach regards the disparity as the
product of errors that individuals are liable to make when facing an unfamiliar
situation for the first time (e.g. Plott and Zeiler, 2005). With repetition and
incentives, they may discover their consistent preferences (Plott, 1996) through a
process of value learning – the understanding of features of their own preferences –
and institutional learning – the understanding of how to best satisfy those preferences
in the context of the specific trading institution (Braga and Starmer, 2005). As far as
the stylised facts are concerned, however, this approach encounters several
difficulties. In the case of shaping effects, one would have to accept that the same
process that is eliminating an error (i.e. the WTA/WTP disparity) is also promoting
new ones (i.e. the systematic influence of market prices on valuations). Explaining
the sensitivity to the auction rules would require more sophisticated mechanisms
behind the errors that produce the disparity in the first place.
The anomalies plus shaping approach revolves around Loomes et al.’s (2003)
shaping hypothesis that individuals use the observed market prices as an anchor when
revising their valuations. The disparity can be explained as a result of some form of
‘anomalous’ behaviour, for instance in terms of loss aversion, though it is probably
more in the spirit of the approach to regard it as a consequence of people having
imprecisely defined preferences and using simple heuristics to work out initial
valuations.18 Not surprisingly, this approach can accommodate shaping effects and
17 The idea that WTA/WTP disparities can be substantial for goods that are difficult to substitute
(Hanemann, 1991) can also, in principle, be extended to incorporate an effect of market experience.
For instance, repeated market experience may change subjects' perception of substitution possibilities
(e.g. by repeatedly thinking about trading, subjects may become more aware of opportunities to trade).
In general, however, substitution effects cannot be the sole factor at work, for, irrespective of
substitution possibilities, the observed WTA/WTP ratios require an implausibly large responsiveness of
WTP to income changes (Sugden, 1999). In fact, the implied income elasticities of WTP are between
three and forty-five times higher than the values obtained by direct measurement (Horowitz and
McConnell, 2003).
18 That people may not have well-formed and readily accessible valuations is also suggested by Ariely
et al.’s (2003) finding that irrelevant pieces of information, such as one's social security number, are
able to significantly affect how much commodities are valued.
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the general decay of the disparity, but its complete erosion for market prices and the
sensitivity of valuations to the auction rules require some extra features (e.g.
underlying reference-independent preferences) or some ancillary assumption, which
seem very likely to conflict with the general flavour of the approach.
Models belonging to the endogenous reference-dependent preferences strand
extend Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) pioneering model, by endogenising either the
reference point (as in Munro and Sugden, 2003, and more recently in Köszegi and
Rabin, 2006), or the degree of loss aversion (as in Loomes et al., 2009). The latter
approach uses Sugden’s (2003) reference-dependent subjective expected utility
framework to make the degree of loss aversion contingent on agents' uncertainty
about the marginal rate of substitution between goods. Certainty is associated with
negligible differences between WTA and WTP, but the gap widens as preference
uncertainty increases. In this context, experience reduces the disparity to the extent
that it reduces preference uncertainty. Shaping effects could be explained if subjects
reacted to preference uncertainty by using the market price as a signal of the value of
the good. However, since the model is not equipped with a specific mechanism
relating uncertainty to feedback and repetition, it is not clear why the same experience
should have a differential impact on marginal and non-marginal traders, nor does it
provide any reason to expect different auction rules to prompt different valuations.
The model proposed by Köszegi and Rabin (2006) is the most straightforward
extension of the idea that the WTA/WTP disparity can be due to loss aversion, first
formalised by Tversky and Kahneman (1991). Although in their paper Tversky and
Kahneman do not explicitly state what the reference point is, in most applications this
has been taken to be defined on the same set of dimensions as the alternatives to be
evaluated (e.g. current endowment, customary consumption, expected outcome). This
is certainly the case in Köszegi and Rabin’s model, in which the reference point is
agents' rational expectation about the outcome of their actions. Individuals are in
personal equilibrium whenever their expectations are correct ex post, that is, when
they carry out their anticipated plans. Since there may be several combinations of
mutually consistent expectations and behaviours, the personal equilibrium is typically
not unique.
How far does this otherwise standard notion of loss aversion fit with the
stylised facts? In order to answer this question, consider an application of Köszegi
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and Rabin’s model to a buying auction. It can reasonably be assumed that, after
sufficient repetition, the market will settle on an equilibrium in which all agents
correctly anticipate the price and behave according to their expectations. In this
situation, traders can be partitioned into equilibrium buyers and equilibrium non-
buyers. Equilibrium buyers buy and expect to buy as a result of consistently buying,
their equilibrium valuations being higher than the reference-independent value, for
not buying the good is now perceived as a loss. Equilibrium non-buyers do not buy
and expect not to buy as a consequence of consistently not buying, their valuations
being lower than the reference-independent values as they were in the first round of
the auction. Due to the fact that in Vickrey auctions the price setter does not trade,
the marginal trader is an equilibrium non-buyer. An entirely symmetrical argument
shows that in selling auctions equilibrium sellers' valuations are lower than the
reference-independent value, while equilibrium non-sellers' (including the price
setter's) valuations stay above the reference-independent value.
The implications of this equilibrium analysis are quite surprising. Despite the
fact that each individual has a unique reference-independent valuation, nobody reports
it. In repeated nd2 -price auctions, in which only one person trades, average WTA
will only slightly decrease, while average WTP will only slightly increase, with
limited impact on the overall disparity. Contrary to Knetsch et al.’s (2001) findings,
in a th9 -price auction with ten traders the decrease in average WTA and the increase
in average WTP will be substantial, and potentially liable to lead to a situation in
which average WTA is well below average WTP. If the same traders were to
participate in both the buying and selling versions of a median auction, WTA and
WTP would coincide for everybody except the marginal trader, but all valuations
would differ from the reference-independent values. These predictions appear to be
impossible to reconcile with the stylised facts.
6 Concluding remarks
The simple assumptions of price sensitivity and bad-deal aversion used in this paper
do a surprisingly good job at reconciling the stylised facts concerning the WTA/WTP
disparity. On this account, the disparity itself is a result of bad-deal aversion.
Shaping effects and the sensitivity to the auction rules are due to WTA and WTP
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valuations being increasing in price expectations, which is an implication of price
sensitivity. The complete erosion of the disparity at the margin, and its persistence on
the aggregate, are the result of the equilibration process following expectation
updating.
The notion that prices often act as reference points is far from new in the
literature. As Wicksteed noted long ago, whether prices are regarded as cheap or dear
can lead to forms of preference reversals like the one illustrated by the following
example.
‘A man might be willing to give a shilling for a knife because he thought it cheap,
and might refuse to give a shilling for a certain pamphlet because he thought it dear,
and yet if he had been offered the direct choice between the pamphlet and the knife
as a present he might have chosen the pamphlet.’ (Wicksteed, 1910, p. 33)
Similarly, Thaler reports that individuals are willing to pay more for a beer
bought in a fancy hotel than for the same beer coming from a run-down
grocery store, because they expect to pay more in the former case than in the
latter (Thaler, 1985, p. 206). Putler (1992) – whose theoretical analysis is in
many ways similar to the derivation of WTP in the present paper19 – reports
that reference price effects can be found in egg sales data from Southern
California. Hu (2007) finds effects of the type predicted by bad-deal
aversion in a hypothetical survey study involving products with new
attributes.
Price sensitivity and bad-deal aversion seem also intuitively
appealing because of their resemblance with the experience of everyday
transactions. For instance, the feeling of disappointment in finding out that
an item we just bought can be found for a cheaper price a few shops down
the road is a rather common experience. Similarly, finding out that we have
saved £5 on our new pair of shoes can easily become a matter of pride and
satisfaction. These types of behaviour are naturally interpreted in terms of
price sensitivity and bad-deal aversion. The increasingly common practice
19 The present analysis extends Putler’s work in four main ways. First, it looks at selling behaviour as
well as buying behaviour. Second, it makes the asymmetry between good and bad deals an essential
component of the model. Third, it allows the reference point to be endogenous. Fourth, it applies the
analysis to the case of repeated Vickrey auctions.
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by retailers to offer a lowest price guarantee might also be regarded as a
consequence of bad-deal aversion. By offering to refund a multiple of the
price difference if the consumer finds the same product at a cheaper price
elsewhere, retailers encourage shoppers’ fidelity by ensuring that they will
not feel ripped off. And price sensitivity can explain the widespread use of
comparative price claims (Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin, 2003), and
occasional promotional sales, as occasionally low prices look like good deals
and boost WTP.
As far as the WTA/WTP disparity is concerned, this paper has shown that the
notion of bad-deal aversion defined with respect to the expected transaction price
appears to be descriptively superior to the idea that preferences are loss averse
relative to a multi-dimensional reference point, interpreted as either the current
endowment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), or the customary consumption (Munro
and Sugden, 2003), or the expected outcome (Köszegi and Rabin, 2006). On the other
hand, loss aversion can explain other findings often regarded as reference-point
effects, such as exchange asymmetries (Knetsch, 1989), or the status quo bias
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), on which, giving the absence of a transaction
price, the bad-deal aversion model is silent.
Do these latter findings suggest that bad-deal aversion is not an interesting
phenomenon? To anyone who is searching for a universal notion of reference point
they probably could. But since other notions of reference point also struggle to fit the
empirical evidence, this may be suggestive that, however theoretically appealing it
may be, a universal notion of reference-point may not exist. And indeed, this form of
obsession with generality – typical of rational choice thinking – is far from the spirit
of behavioural economics (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). Taking a broader perspective,
the aversion to feelings of regret (Loomes and Sugden, 1982), or to inequality (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999) may also be regarded as forms of reference-dependence, for they
share the common feature of being formalised through some sort of reference point
from which positive and negative components are treated asymmetrically or non-
linearly. If the range of reference-dependent phenomena is so wide, it should not be
surprising if different situations primed different reference points. Rather than asking
if there is a universal notion of reference point, a more interesting issue seems to be
what features of the context are more salient, and therefore more likely to act as
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reference points, in particular circumstances. As suggested in this paper, the expected
price of the transaction seems to be an appropriate reference point for explaining the
WTA/WTP disparity.
Appendix
Proof of Result 1
In the model, price sensitivity entails 0> . Irrespective of bad-deal aversion
)(   , the Result follows immediately from noting that WTA and WTP in
Equations (5) and (7) are weighted averages of γ and pe. As such, they always lie
between these two values 
Proof of Result 2
Recall that price sensitivity and bad-deal aversion imply 0>> .
i) Recall that WTA and WTP in Equations (5) and (7) are weighted averages
of γ and pe. Note that  > implies )1/(1>)1/(1   . Since weights always add
up to one, it follows that )/(1<)/(1   .  Therefore, when γ < pe, the weight
attached to the smaller of the two values, γ, is higher for WTP than for WTA, while
the larger value, pe, is weighed more in WTA than in WTP.
ii) This follows immediately from substituting =ep in any of the
expressions in (5) and (7).
iii) Same as i). Compared to WTP, WTA gives more weight to the higher, and
less to the lower, of γ and pe 
Proof of Result 3
The Result is a direct implication of Result 2 
Proof of Result 4
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This is a consequence of Remark 1. )(WTA eitit p and )(WTP
e
itit p are increasing in
e
itp . As such, they vary in the same direction as
e
itp 
Proof of Result 5
As for Result 4, this is also a straightforward implication of Remark 1 
Proof of Result 6
Consider a kth-price selling auction, so that iiV WTA= . The proof for the
thkn 1)( 
-price buying auction is entirely analogous. According to Result 1, when ppei = *,
agent i can be in one of the three situations depicted in Figures 1 to 3. Either: a)
pVii << *, or b) pVii == *, or c) pVii >> *. Remember that the i 's are
indexed from lowest to highest, so that n  21 . This implies that the k
th
lowest intrinsic valuation is k . Now also rank the iV 's from lowest to highest.
According to a), traders whose ki  < will have a rank lower than k, while those with
ki  > will have a rank higher than k. This proves )i and )iii . It also implies that
the trader whose ki  = will have the k
th lowest iV . Since this becomes the market
price, and the market price is equal to the expected price for all traders, for the
marginal trader Equation (5) entails that pVkk == *. This concludes the proof 
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